La Sentencia INTEL (As. T-286/09) reenv. del Tribunal General de la Unión Europea, del 26 de enero de 2022¿una nueva era en la aplicación del artículo 102 TFUE?

  1. Fernando Díez Estella
Zeitschrift:
Revista de derecho de la competencia y la distribución

ISSN: 1888-3052

Datum der Publikation: 2022

Nummer: 30

Art: Artikel

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Andere Publikationen in: Revista de derecho de la competencia y la distribución

Zusammenfassung

En el ámbito del Derecho de Competencia en la UE hay pocos preceptos tan complicados de aplicar como la prohibición de abuso de posición dominante contenida en el actual art. 102 TFUE. El enfoque que la Comisión Europea estaba adoptando en sus expedientes sancionadores ha sido constantemente objeto de feroces críticas, por considerarlo excesivamente legalista y formalista, y que adoptaba una perspectiva per se de la prohibición, contraria al moderno análisis económico antitrust. Una manifestación de este enfoque fue la cuantiosa multa en el año 2009 (más de 1.000 millones de euros) a la compañía INTEL por supuestas prácticas abusivas en sus políticas de descuentos. Trece años después, el pasado año 2022, en un histórico pronunciamiento, el Tribunal General de la UE (TG) ha anulado por completo la Decisión de la CE, y sentado las bases de un nuevo entendimiento de este precepto. En particular, se plantea la aplicación del test del “competidor tan eficiente” (conocido como AEC test, por sus siglas en inglés) como herramienta analítica para determinar si una concreta política de precios o descuentos tiene la capacidad de provocar un efecto de cierre del mercado (foreclosure). En este trabajo se analiza esta Sentencia, sus antecedentes y las sustanciales implicaciones que tiene en cuanto al conocido como “more-economic-approach” del derecho antitrust comunitario.

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Fuente de los datos: Dialnet